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I. INTRODUCTION
Multinational enterprises (MNEs),' gigantic corporations of
the Western World, often have incomes greater than many devel-
oping nations' gross national products (GNPs). They conduct
much of their business in small nations, generating huge profits at
the expense of these small countries and their citizens. Further,
MNEs have often exploited the resources of developing nations,
which lack the infrastructure to effectively regulate the activities of
MNEs within their borders. Public international law has also
proved ineffective at regulating MNEs.
This Article asserts that MNE conduct should be self-regu-
lated, specifically through private internal codes of conduct. Pri-
vate codes are declarations of standards that MNEs must require
of their employees. Typical standards include a canon of ethics and
statements not to exploit nations where the MNEs do business.
These private codes are flexible, of individually tailored design,
easy to apply, and possess internal pressures for compliance. Thus,
they are the best available, most effective form of regulation.
Part II discusses the history of MNEs, focusing on the under-
lying difficulties of their regulation. Parts III through VI trace the
history of public codes of conduct, while Part VII explores the ef-
fect of public international law on MNEs. The remainder of the
Article examines the history, usefulness, and desirability of private
codes of conduct. This author conducted an informal survey of sev-
eral large MNEs.2 The results of this survey are presented in Part
Ix.
1. Multinational enterprises are also referred to as multinational corporations (MNCs)
or transnational corporations (TNCs).
2. The MNEs surveyed were taken from a 1992 Forbes list of the largest U.S. multina-
tionals. U.S. Corporations With the Biggest Foreign Revenues, FoRBEs, July 20, 1992, at
298. The author sent surveys to the 50 largest MNEs and received 9 responses.
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II. HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
Intellectual archaeologists traced the origins of MNEs to the
fifteenth century Fuggers merchant family, who were based in
Augsburg and operated various businesses throughout Europe.3
Others linked the origins of MNEs to pre-nineteenth century com-
panies, which, as heavy users of raw materials, sought their supply
of these materials abroad.4 However, there is little documentation
to verify the conduct of MNEs during their earliest ventures.'
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, great merchant
companies emerged, often as a result of imperialism and colonial-
ism in an era of exploration.8 They were usually granted royal
charters or monopolies to conduct trade in certain geographic
zones on the globe.7 The British East India Company, for example,
possessed import monopolies in Europe on all tea from Asia.'
Great monopoly power characterized the activities of these early
colonial trading companies.9 These prototypical MNEs were the
precursors to the modern economically interdependent world.10
Nineteenth century improvements in transportation enabled
the multinational trading company to enter foreign markets and to
acquire many of the features associated with MNEs today. The
end of World War II caused a surge of U.S. investment in Europe
which sent MNEs in search of new manufacturing ventures as op-
posed to import/export transactions." By the late twentieth cen-
tury, technological innovations such as instantaneous communica-
tion, information systems, and the electronic transfer of large sums
3. See KWAMENA ACQUAAH, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS: THE NEW REALITY 45 (1986).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. PHILIPPE CHALMIN, TRADERS AND MERCHANTS, PANORMA OF INTERNATIONAL COMMOD-
try TRADING 7-9 (Erica E. Long-Michalke trans., 2d ed. 1987). See generally Louis TURNER,
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD 17-28 (1973) (discussing the "drive for
empires" of Europe and America in the late 19th century).
7. CHALMIN, supra note 6, at 7-9.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 570 (1973). The
rise of world empires from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries confused the relation-
ships between nations. Id. Colonialism created relations among distant peoples that were
formerly only available by peoples within a nation. Id. Laws were enacted into treaties, and
"international" trade became trade within an empire. Id.
11. ACQUAAH, supra note 3, at 45.
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of money across the oceans characterized MNE ventures. 12
While MNEs historically organized in a wide variety of forms,
they shared some common characteristics. These included manage-
rial skills, access to and control of technological information, and
the ability to attract talent.18 These qualities gave MNEs a great
deal of power, which they continue to hold today.
The distinguishing mark of today's MNEs is their actual, po-
tential, and perceived power and influence in host countries. 14
Through direct participation in vital sectors such as production,
distribution, and service, MNEs presently maintain as much influ-
ence within host countries as they did in the past.'5 Many MNEs
are economically more powerful than nations."e In 1985, for exam-
ple, the 350 largest MNEs had combined sales of $2.7 trillion,
roughly one-half of the combined GNP of the industrial market
economies and several hundred billion dollars greater than the
combined GNPs of all developing countries, including China.17
Yet, the extraordinary profits made by multinationals have often
come at others' expense.'L Ahues have traditionally included the
exploitation of indigenous natural resources and labor supplies.'9
Today, however, MNEs may enter a host country with slightly
different, though not necessarily unselfish, reasons. For example,
MNEs may conduct activity internationally to avoid expensive
compliance with safety or environmental regulations in their own
12. See JACK N. BEHRMALN, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE:
TENSIONS AMONG THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNTRIES 16-19 (1970).
13. See generally ACQuAAH, supra note 3, at 43-44, 46, 48.
14. Hans W. Baade, Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, in 1 LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 407 (Norbert Horn ed.,
1980).
15. Id. at 409.
16. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INr'L TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D
CONG., lSr SESS., HEARINGS ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 404 (Comm. Print 1973).
MNEs "often possess considerably greater material resources than many nation-states
which enables them under certain conditions to exert more powerful influences in the inter-
national sphere than the governments of many middle-sized and small states." WERaE J.
FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS: A STUDY OF BusINzsS, LABOR, AND
POLITICAL GROUPS 4 (1972).
17. Gerard Piel, Globalopolies, 254 NATION 652, 652 (1992).
18. Critics of MNEs cite the following abuses: the exploitation of local labor and re-
sources; the loss of profits to the host country which are earned locally; MNEs' use of scarce
local capital to finance their operations; and MNEs' failure to import capital to host coun-
tries. See ROBERT COHEN & JEFFREY FlRIAN, THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER 161-63 (Edwin P. Reubens ed., 1981).
19. Id. at 161.
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country.20 Relocation enables MNEs to hire less expensive foreign
labor, thus avoiding the high cost of domestic labor and the de-
mands of domestic labor unions.
Questionable MNE business tactics have plagued international
arrangements between host countries and MNEs. Although host
countries have long been aware of the one-sided nature of their
agreements, they are often powerless to negotiate." Host countries,
lacking information, capital, technology, and a skilled labor supply
possess little bargaining power. Moreover, host countries desper-
ately need foreign investment to stimulate their economies and
feed and clothe their population.22 Consequently, host countries
have been vulnerable to MNEs exploitation.
In succumbing to the pressures of MNEs, many host countries
experience disastrous consequences. The absence of a governing
body to monitor and control the relationships between MNEs and
host countries permits corruption to pervade MNE activity. Brib-
ery perpetuates a locally-accepted business practice 2 as competi-
tion among multinationals forces corporations to hire local
"agents" with access to influential people in developing areas. 4
Due to corruption, host countries sometimes become unstable, sub-
ject to political upheaval or revolution.25 Additionally, MNE activ-
20. One of the most debated issues regarding the proposed U.S.-Mexico Free Trade
Agreement is the prevention of environmental abuses by U.S. companies along the Texas-
Mexico border. Some U.S. environmentalists have argued that lax Mexican standards will
entice companies to relocate to Mexico to avoid costly U.S. regulations. Mexico Announces
Plan to Protect Environment Along Northern Border, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at
1594-95 (Oct. 30, 1991).
21. COHEN & FRIEDEN, supra note 18, at 163.
22. Theodore Panayotou, Counting the Cost: Resource Degradation in the Developing
World, in THE FLETCHER FORUM oF WORLD AFFAIRS 270, 276 (1990).
23. Bribery remains a problem today, as evidenced by recent steps of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to curb bribes in international trade
and investment. See OECD to Develop Guidelines to Curb Bribery in International Trans-
actions, BNA, Apr. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Drexec File.
24. Barry Kramer, Payments for Foreign Contracts.... WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1978, at 8.
25. For example, during the Peruvian revolution of 1968, International Petroleum Cor-
poration (IPC) agreed with Peruvian President Belaunde to return ownership of oil fields to
the government. Louis TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD 11-12
(1973). A scandal erupted over a missing page in the contract's text. Id. The ruling party
divided, causing the military to suspend civilian rule and expropriate IPC's Peruvian assets.
Id.
A second example is the Chilean coup of 1973. See Jonathan Kandell, Foreign Compa-
nies Aided Anti-Allende Strikers, Chileans Say, N.Y. TIsS, Oct. 16, 1974, at 8. After the
military coup of 1973 overthrew President Salvador Allende, MNEs and the CIA revealed
that they had financed anti-Allende strikes. Id. The revolution stopped Allende's policy of
nationalizing copper mines, 90% of which were MNE owned. Id.; see also AcQuAAH, supra
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ity aggravates existing class divisions. Profits from MNE activity
often only reach the hands of the privileged, increasing the dichot-
omy between the wealthy land owning bureaucrats and the poor,
uneducated, and unskilled labor supply.
2
Another negative effect of MNE domination is their use of in-
digenous natural resources without regard to the consequences of
exploiting and destroying those natural resources.2 7 When the re-
sources run out, or when their market price becomes so low that it
prevents further development, the host country is left with unem-
ployed, relatively untrained workers. While one can observe a host
country's depletion of natural resources, increased unemployment,
or environmental contamination, one cannot measure all the de-
structive effects of MNE activities in developing nations.2"
The various destructive forces, endless cycles of poverty, and
human oppression resulting from unfettered multinational activity
cannot be easily categorized. The remarkable economic expansion
of the last fifty years instigated by MNEs has not necessarily im-
proved the well-being of the v7ast majority of pol iigi n
derdeveloped urban and rural areas .2  For these people, economic
development has not meant economic growth. MNE profits have
not "trickled down" as theorized, and while some changes have oc-
curred, they are inadequate to be of significant aid to a suffering
population."0
Poverty's extent in developing nations is stunning.3" While es-
note 3, at 38 (MNEs "will stop at nothing including provoking or engineering the overthrow
of legitimately elected governments in Third World countries where it serves their
purpose.").
26. Home country nationals tend to dominate management positions. See STEFAN H.
RoBOCK & KENNETH SIMMONDS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
10 (3d ed. 1983). Moreover, host countries are often apathetic to the needs of their unskilled
labor supply. For example, in negotiations between the United States and Mexico on the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico's government has refused to
change Mexico's labor practices. James Zimmerman, Laboring Under No Illusions, RE-
CORDER, July 30, 1993, at 6 ("Government officials have gone so far as to advertise in U.S.
business magazines that manufacturers can reduce their labor costs to less than $1 per hour
(including benefits) if production is moved to Mexico.").
27. Panayotou, supra note 22, at 271.
28. For example, in Thailand an area of undisturbed forest was rapidly cleared without
regard to any long-term planning considerations. Today, the area is devastated by soil ero-
sion and salinization, rendering forestry and agriculture impossible. Id. at 272.
29. See MULTINATIONAL MANAGERS AND POVERTY IN THE THIRD WORLD 4 (Lee A. Tavis
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timates vary, at least two billion people do not have the necessary
resources to live."2 They are plagued by preventable illness, lack of
food, and inadequate planning for natural disasters.3" Millions of
people live in villages and slums where conditions are well below
the standard that most Westerners would characterize as abject
poverty.8 ' People are poor, hungry, diseased, illiterate, unem-
ployed, and die young."
These conditions raise serious issues for MNEs. What should
be the proper relationship between modern MNEs and the host
country's government? How can MNEs best balance the interests
of their shareholders against the interests of the domestic foreign
economy where they operate?
To decrease objectionable consequences and insure increased
long-term stability in multinational business transactions, host
countries want tools to gain more control over the actions of MNEs
operating within their domestic borders. In general, host countries
desire a system that will ensure that MNEs act ethically and allow
for scrutiny of MNE practices.
There are many viable options, including educating the local
workforce or subsidizing foreign economic development programs.
Nonetheless, a more practical and realistic approach for the corpo-
rate practitioner or planner is the development of corporate codes
of conduct.
III. PURPOSE OF CODES OF CONDUCT
A code of conduct is a written statement of standards by
which a host country can expect MNEs to act." Codes should
bring predictability and certainty to the relationship, while provid-
ing guidelines within which both parties can operate
knowledgeably.
3 7
A code of conduct can serve several useful purposes. 8 A well
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Peter Hansen & Victoria Aranda, An Emerging International Framework for
Transnational Corporations, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 881, 885 (1991); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl
A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil & Criminal Liability: A Second Look at
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEo. L.J. 1559, 1559 n.1 (1990).
37. See Hansen & Aranda, supra note 36, at 886-87.
38. The function or purpose of a code of conduct is limited only by the imagination of
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drafted code will preserve a national government's independence
by mandating that MNEs decrease their involvement in the do-
mestic political arena. A code, for example, could attempt to stim-
ulate the economy of undeveloped regions of the host country or to
redistribute the wealth to the labor class. Activities such as brib-
ery, tax evasion, or other practices that defraud the public could be
prohibited. Codes could regulate anti-competitive behavior, such as
dumping or protectionism. Codes could also include moral and eth-
ical standards of behavior. Additionally, codes might require that
host countries fairly compensate MNEs for actions such as expro-
priation or nationalization.
Other provisions could reduce the risk of court ordered judg-
ments and the risk of international investment flows. These goals
would be especially suitable for U.S. companies facing intrusive
and complex laws and regulations on the domestic front which
their competitors do not face.
IV. HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF CODES OF CONDUCT
While most modern corporate codes have been introduced in
the last twenty years,"9 codes of conduct have a rich origin from
two historical concepts.4" The first concept is the distrust of corpo-
rate control, dating back to ancient Roman times when the corpo-
rate structure was first utilized. 1 Roman law heavily regulated cor-
porations because the population received them with great
animosity. 2
the drafter. One author summarizes the purpose of codes of conduct as "establishing an
agreement between governments on rules of governmental conduct, harmonizing national
laws and regulations, supplementing national laws, providing internationally accepted mod-
els for national laws, increasing the effectiveness of national laws, [and] providing alterna-
tive ways to subject private enterprise to public and governmental policies." RAYMOND J.
WALDMANN, REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS THROUGH CODES OF CONDUCT 21-23
(1980).
39. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 36, at 1559.
40. For a detailed discussion of the history of corporate codes of conduct, see id. at
1574-1600.
41. Blackstone ascribes the development of the corporation to Numa Pompilius (715 -
672 B.C.) who found Rome "torn to pieces by the two rival factions of the Sabines and
Romans .... 1 Sm WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARImS ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 468-69
(photo. reprint 1978) (1783). Pompilius thought it wise to divide these two groups into many
smaller ones comprised of specialized trades and professions. Id.
42. Rome scrutinized and supervised every aspect of corporate formation, management,
and dissolution. W. FL-ETcHR, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1 (Per-
manent ed. 1990).
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This same skepticism can be seen in the middle of the eight-
eenth century of U.S. history.4' United States colonists were suspi-
cious of corporations because corporations represented the privi-
leged society against which the settlers were rebelling."
Eventually, as taxes were needed for major government works, the
government granted charters to private organizations to serve in
semi-public capacities such as canal, bridge, and turnpike compa-
nies.45 As the Industrial Revolution demanded more capital, the
corporate structure, with its ability to attract capital and limit
shareholder liability, became an essential part of the United States
economy."
A second historical concept integral to the development of
modern corporate codes was the North American belief that self-
regulation was more effective and preferable than government reg-
ulation.' 7 However, industry self-regulation existed prior to the de-
velopment of the North American economy.' s Merchant and craft
guilds of Medieval Europe regulated their members' conduct, pro-
vided for their social well-being, and controlled the markets.'9 Fa-
miliar examples of these self-regulating units survive today in gov-
ernment sanctioned forms, such as the National Association of
Securities Dealers.
50
These two historical concepts, combined with the government
and business scandals of the 1980s, 11 laid the foundation for the
modern idea that public corporations should develop and enforce
written codes of corporate conduct.5 2
43. Id. § 6.
44. I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED 28 (1931).
45. Id. at 31.
46. Id. at 32.
47. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 36, at 1561, 1576-78.
48. See ANTONY BLACK, GUILDS AND CIvnL SocIEry IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
FROM THE TWELFTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 6 (1984).
49. Id. at 4.
50. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 36, at 1578.
51. Pitt and Groskaufmanis credit a large degree of corporate self-regulation and the
emergence of corporate codes of conduct to the insider trading scandals that occurred in the
United States in the 1980s. "The evolution of the insider trading ban under section 10(b) of
the [Securities and] Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 fostered the development of internal
codes of conduct. [E]xtensive and complex compliance and training programs [were devel-
oped] to diminish these conflicts of interest." Id. at 1588-89 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 1598-1600.
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V. CODES OF CONDUCT AND ETHICS
Although corporate codes are becoming more prevalent in all
types of corporations, there is a greater need for them in the mul-
tinational context because of the complex ethical and moral issues
raised by the commercial activities of MNEs. Multinational man-
agers are aware that the poverty which pervades developing na-
tions cannot be allowed to continue.3 "The most fundamental
human right is to survive, and no matter where the minimum stan-
dard for basic human needs is set, millions and millions of people
fall far short of that threshold.""'
Multinationals have a close relationship to the poor through
their commercial activities in developing countries." As an eco-
nomic liaison between developed and developing countries, MNEs
provide a means of balancing international resources.56 Because
they control the exchange of resources and are closely tied to local
development issues, MNEs have many links to the host country's
people and are positioned to aid these people.57 Yet, MNEs which
accept the challenge of overcoming poverty must balance compet-
ing responsibilities: on the one hand, maximizing shareholder prof-
its, and on the other hand, searching for solutions to the poverty
crisis in poor developing nations.
Fortunately, as the scrutiny of MNEs increases, there is a
growing international sensitivity to the non-economic conse-
quences of their economic activity. 8 As more attention focuses on
international business, increased adoption of codes of conduct will
aid in the establishment of a more ethical atmosphere. Arguably,
in the long-run, real or perceived unethical conduct by multina-
tionals is likely to put the social acceptability and the credibility of
the free market system at stake. Only if entrepreneurs offer con-
structive solutions to important societal problems in an ethically
acceptable way will MNEs enjoy freedom of action. Ethical con-
duct in developing nations is vital to the long-term existence of
any corporation.5
53. MULTINATIONAL MANAGERS, supra note 29, at 5.
54. Id. at 4-5.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Klaus M. Leisinger, Multinationals and the Third World: Sell Solutions, Not Just
Products, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1988, § 3, at 3.
59. Id.
408 [Vol. 24:3
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Even if no recognized legal duty exists, a growing number of
experts insist that corporations have a moral responsibility to en-
force high standards, especially in countries unable to regulate
MNEs60 Recognition of the importance of social responsibility to-
ward foreign countries is one of the main forces driving the in-
creased use of codes of conduct.0 1 While codes may have different
approaches to the various ethical problems, they uniformly state a
desire to break the cycle of oppression in host countries and to
provide a decision-making tool for MNEs as they face difficult
moral dilemmas.
VI. RECOGNITION OF MODERN CODES OF CONDUCT
The recognition of codes and their accompanying benefits is
steadily increasing.2 Between 1971 and 1980, virtually all major
international governmental organizations interested in interna-
tional trade and investment developed detailed proposals for MNE
codes of conduct."3 These organizations include committees in the
United Nations, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the Council of Europe, the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC), and the Organization of American States (OAS).' Ad-
ditionally, non-governmental international organizations pushing
for codes of conduct include the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC).6
VII. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The United Nations (U.N.) is a principal actor in the push for
codes of conduct. The most significant and controversial code
promulgated by the U.N. is entitled the "Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations" which the United Nations Commis-
sion on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) drafted after 14
60. Stuart Diamond, Disaster in India Sharpens Debate on Doing Business in the
Third World: Corporations Forced to Reassess Risks and to Review Safety Rules, N.Y.
TimEs, Dec. 16, 1984, § 1, at 1 (discussing the 1984 poisonous gas disaster at the Union
Carbide Plant in Bhopal, India).
61. See generally Leisinger, supra note 58, at 3.
62. See Baade, supra note 14, at 408-12.
63. Id. at 412.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 413.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
years of negotiations."
The UNCTC, established in 1974,67 serves as a forum for the
study of issues relating to transnational corporations. It also assists
the U.N. Economic and Social Council in developing a code of con-
duct. 8 The UNCTC is comprised of up to forty-eight states
elected by the Economic and Social Council.6 9
The Economic and Social Council created the Commission
with a mandate that its "highest priority of work" was to enact a
code of conduct for transnational corporations.7 0 Although work
began on the code in 1977,71 and the UNCTC prepared a draft in
1990, the U.N. has yet to adopt it.
The latest draft is universally applicable to all transnational
corporations. 2 Under the Draft Code of Conduct, transnational
corporations are defined as enterprises composed of entities in two
or more countries which operate under a related system of decision
making.73 The Draft Code is aimed at being "an essential element
in the strengthening of international economic and social co-opera-
tion . . .to maximize the contributions of transnational corpora-
tions to economic development and growth and to minimize the
negative effects of the activities of these corporations."'7
Many host countries view the Draft Code of Conduct, as
promulgated by a public international organization, as a neces-
sity.75 Public law is viewed by some as the best vehicle for compli-
ance because it may be binding and because the existing laws of
developing countries do not address the problems stemming from
the activities of MNEs operating within their borders.76 Because
66. See Draft U.N. Code of Conduct for Companies Needs to be More Balanced, U.S.
Aide Says, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1650 (Oct. 31, 1990) [hereinafter Conduct
for Companies]. A detailed explanation of the history and origin of this proposed code is
beyond the scope of this paper.
67. 1 Y.B. INr'L ORG. 1160-61 (Union of Int'l Assoc. ed., 1990-91).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Proposed Text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N.
E.C.O.S.O.C., 2d Sess., Annex, at pmbl., U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990) [hereinafter Draft
Code of Conduct].
71. Pieter Sanders, Implementing International Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Enterprises, 30 AM. J. Com. L. 241, 242 (1982).
72. Draft Code of Conduct, supra note 70, at 1.
73. Id.
74. Id. at pmbl.
75. Baade, supra note 14, at 416.
76. See P. EBow BONDZJ-SIMPSON, LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS AND HOST STATES 37 (1990); CYrTHA D. WALLAcE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MuL-
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the U.N. wrote the proposed Code, it would become part of the
body of public international law that governs member states of the
U.N. and would provide universal standards that all developing na-
tions could turn to for protection.
7
The Draft Code of Conduct is meant to be comprehensive, in-
corporating more specialized texts developed by UNCTAD, ILO,
and the ICC.7 ' The EEC, the Council of Europe, the OAS, and the
ICFTU also provided input.79 Under the Draft Code, MNEs would
generally be required to respect the rights of individuals in host
countries and to avoid interfering with government regulation10
The Draft Code imposes broad duties relating to human
rights, corrupt payments, local ownership and control, compliance
with national economic and development objectives, restrictive
business practices, taxation, and transfer pricing. 1 In addition,
MNEs must disclose to the public of the host country information
about the corporation, including financial data. 2
The Draft Code of Conduct is hotly debated, and no end to
the controversy is in sight. Much of the debate over the Draft Code
revolves around its heavy restrictions on MNEs operating in for-
eign countries because host governments are not forced to abide by
equally restrictive guidelines on issues such as expropriation, na-
tional treatment, profit repatriation, and respect for international
law 8 Another reason the Draft Code is facing difficulty is that de-
veloping countries are not pressing for its adoption to the degree
TINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: NATIONAL REGULATORY TECHNIQUES AND THE PROSPECTS FOR INTER-
NATIONAL CONTROLS 83-84 (1982).
77. Less developed countries lacking indigenous interests have consistently pursued
what is called the maximalist position: one calling for legally binding, internationally en-
forceable rules of conduct for MNEs. On the other hand, the international business commu-
nity and some leading home countries have adopted the minimalist position, which is based
on voluntary, rather than enforceable guidelines. Baade, supra note 14, at 440.
78. Id. at 440-41.
79. Id.
80. Draft Code of Conduct, supra note 70, 11 14, 16-19.
81. Id. 21-34.
82. Id. 44-46. Other selected provisions require that MNEs:
1) conduct business with regard to the health and safety of consumers and the
environment;
2) respect human rights and fundamental freedoms;
3) provide certain corporate information to an employee representative, and to
disclose whether their products have been banned in other countries; and
4) reach agreement with the host countries on methods for resolving disputes.
Id.
83. Conduct for Companies, supra note 66, at 1650.
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that they did in the 1970s. 4
While the Draft Code does provide needed controls over the
actions of MNEs, Western countries and corporations view it as
too one-sided to be taken seriously."' MNE participation in the
making of the Draft Code has been extremely limited,8 6 resulting
in a broadly worded document that fails to address the specific
needs of individual parties to international transactions.
7
Even if the varying interests affected by the Draft Code could
come together in agreement on its provisions to ensure ratification,
84. Id.
85. United States officials indicated that the United States intended to oppose adop-
tion of the U.N. Draft Code of Conduct. Thus, after 14 years of drafting, it appears the
Code will receive little support from the United States. U.S. to Oppose Adoption of U.N.
Code on Foreign Investment, U.S. Official Says, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1584
(Oct. 17, 1990).
The United States views the Code as being unbalanced, emphasizing restrictions on
corporate behavior over host government responsibility. Conduct for Companies, supra note
66, at 1650. Raymond Waldmann notes:
In the President's International Economic Report of 1975 which addressed the
Transnational Code, the U.S. emphasized that any code dealing with MNE cor-
porations should:
- articulate general principles of good business practice applicable to national as
well as multinational enterprises and state-owned as well as privately owned en-
terprises be voluntary rather then mandatory,
- be nondiscriminatory toward foreign investment,
acknowledge existing principles of international law (especially those governing
the treatment of foreigners and their property),
- endorse international arbitration for settling investment disputes,
- acknowledge the responsibilities of governments to resolve problems arising
from conflicting government requirements,
- affirm that governments and enterprises must respect contractual obligations.
WALDMANN, supra note 38, at 83.
86. Although the Code is aimed at MNEs, international practice and custom has pre-
cluded MNEs from directly participating in the construction and drafting of this proposed
legislation. All of the participants, except the ILO, are nation-state representatives. The
U.N. traditionally limits business and labor representatives to observer status and grants
such representatives only limited rights to be present or speak at formal sessions. See gener-
ally Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public Interna-
tional Law, 1983 DuKE LJ. 748, 750-51.
87. Id. at 754.
The failure to allow direct TNC participation in the development of potential
international law imposes unnecessary costs on the international legal system.
Because the proposed codes do not resolve the underlying political and economic
issues, they merely convert these controversies into legal issues. Failing to bring
the major international actors into this process does little to advance relevant
interests and imposes unnecessary risks on the inherently frail international le-
gal system.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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the Draft Code would remain practically impotent."" This is be-
cause issues regarding the interpretation," implementation, en-
forcement,90 and constitutionality of the Code present a Pandora's
box of questions with no viable answers. Without a way to force
U.S. companies' compliance with Code provisions, the U.N. will
probably be left with nothing more than a non-binding resolution
or declaration of the U.N. General Assembly."1
Even if the Code is ratified with some enforcement mecha-
nisms, there is still no assurance that it will achieve its goals. Be-
cause the Draft Code imposes new costs on MNE development, the
financial incentives necessary to attract MNE investment in devel-
oping countries may disappear. With all these factors working
against the Draft Code, its effectiveness will depend on the degree
of consensus among involved host countries.
Public international law acts in much the same way as an or-
der imposed on MNEs without their consent or participation. If
public international law is the only accepted way to prevent ex-
ploitation and encourage ethical conduct by MNEs, then MNEs
are denied the opportunity to install their own measures to achieve
these goals.
Thus, when MNEs accept that public law must make changes
for them, they admit that they are unable to make these changes
from within their own organization. Yet, any truly successful trans-
formation must occur on an individual level. While one MNE can-
not single-handedly reform the conduct of international business,
it can, however, try to discover and protect against abuses within
itself.
88. Id. at 757.
89. The Code can be interpreted differently by any number of actors, each with their
own interests. Actors may include the host country's government, transnational corporations
or their affiliates, trade unions, the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, any
non-governmental organization, or another private party. For a more comprehensive listing,
see A.A. Fatouros, The UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: Problems of
Interpretations and Implementation, in EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT: MULTINATIONAL CODES AND CORPORATE CONDUCT 101, 114-15 (Seymour J.
Rubin & Gary C. Hufbauer eds., 1984).
90. See Sanders, supra note 71, at 243; Richard Schwartz, Are the OECD and the
UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding?, 11 INT'L LAW. 529 (1977).
Absent a sovereign to issue commands, a court system to determine violations, or a
police force to punish violators, international law is only law if people choose to follow it.
Charney, supra note 86, at 756-57.
91. Sanders, supra note 71, at 243.
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VIII. PRIVATE CODES OF CONDUCT
In an increasingly competitive and sophisticated international
marketplace, foreign countries are demanding more control over
the operations of MNEs within their boundaries.92 While public in-
ternational law has addressed this problem,s it has done so unsuc-
cessfully. 4 One solution may lie in private codes of conduct.
Adopting voluntary private codes of conduct is an effective
way for MNEs to overcome the limitations of public international
law." A private code of conduct shares the desired results of a
public code, but has a greater potential for success than a public
code in promoting integrity among international corporate execu-
tives. Domestically, corporate codes of conduct have slowly evolved
into a customary corporate document."' Moreover, both market
and non-market rationales favor adopting private codes
internationally.
Private codes ensure that MNE operations are in harmony
with the national policies of the countries where they operate and
also strengthen the mutual confidence between the MNE and the
government of the host country.97 Private codes increase political
stability in developing nations by increasing the host country's ne-
gotiating power with the MNE.9 s Voluntary codes of conduct can
92. See Charney, supra note 86, at 765. Nations, believing that a power struggle is tak-
ing place between themselves and MNEs, resist allowing MNEs the power to influence in-
ternational law. Id.
93. See, e.g., Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Con-
trol of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 813 (1980); International Labor Organization: Tripartite Declaration of Principles
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978);
Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201
(S-VI), 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715
(1974).
94. One commentator asserts that public international law has been unsuccessful at
regulating MNEs because MNEs have been excluded from participating in the development
of international law. Charney, supra note 86, at 750-51.
95. "The simple assumption that legally binding is in some sense superior to voluntary
codes is questionable. Even a legally binding code is not likely to invoke penalties for infrac-
tions. The GATT very rarely authorizes compensatory measures, and the IMF tolerates as-
sorted departures from the standards laid down in its Articles of Agreement." SEYMOUR J.
RUBIN & GARY C. HUPBAUER, EMERGING STANDARDS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT. MULTINA-
TIONAL CODES AND CORPORATE CONDUCT 182 (Seymour J. Rubin & Gary C. Hufbauer, eds.
1984).
96. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 36, at 1559.
97. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Declaration on Inter-
national Investment and Multinational Enterprises, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976).
98. Joel Davidow & Lisa Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or
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increase public trust in the business sector and bring multinational
activity in line with public expectations.
By implementing their own private codes, MNEs may dis-
suade the host country's government from enacting restrictive
laws. Voluntary domestic measures can also serve as a public rela-
tions or marketing mechanism by enhancing the public perception
of the MNE in host countries.9 9 The code demonstrates to the host
country that the MNE is aware of potential problems and is acting
to prevent them. Because codes of conduct often contain provi-
sions regarding the dissemination of corporate information in the
host country, the code can even aid the public's understanding of
MNEs' needs and behavior patterns.100
By developing individualized codes of conduct, MNEs can tai-
lor a code to their own needs and the needs of their customers. For
example, codes may contain general provisions regarding:
1) disclosure and employee behavior;
2) integrity of accounting and financial records;
3) corporate governance;
4) responsibilities as an employer;
5) the function of the board;
6) description of activities;
7) duties to customers; and
8) responsibilities to the community.
Moreover, codes of conduct can be narrowly tailored to a
MNE's business area. Consequently, by drafting a code around the
specific needs of the country, problems, or industry, MNEs can
better define the interested parties and thus decrease the potential
for serious dispute.
The benefits of a narrowly tailored code are illustrated by con-
Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Prac-
tices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 298 (1978).
99. The value of the code as a public relations tool should not be underestimated.
Many host countries despise the presence of MNEs within their borders. In foreign invest-
ment, for example, it is well documented that Latin American countries have great fears
that MNEs, if left unrestricted, could end up owning their entire countries. See Mark B.
Baker & Mark D. Holmes, An Analysis of Latin American Foreign Investment Law: Pro-
posals for Striking a Balance Between Foreign Investment and Political Stability, 23 U.
MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REv. 1, 11 (1991).
100. MNEs should publish information on their structure, activities, and policies to im-
prove public understanding. See George W. Coombe, Jr., Multinational Codes of Conduct
and Corporate Accountability: New Opportunities for Corporate Council 36 Bus. LAW. 11,
14-15 (1980).
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sidering the effect of a single code on the activities of a MNE with
enterprises in several global regions. Should the code apply equally
to nations with hundreds of millions of inhabitants and nations
with less then one million? What about a nation with an economy
measured in trillions of dollars as opposed to a country that relies
on a single export commodity and has a total economic product
less than many private corporations? In a diverse and ever-chang-
ing world, the freedom to negotiate individual codes is at a
premium.
A private code serves as a general moral statement by
MNEs. 101 The code manifests a corporate intent to engage in ethi-
cal behavior and to obey the law.'02 Thus, dissemination of the
code would enhance a MNE's image in an area where "image en-
hancement is direly needed,' 0 3 and show that a MNE is sensitive
to the needs of the host country.
Another advantage of voluntary codes is that they do not re-
quire congressional or parliamentary approval.104 Business entities
of all sizes can draft a voluntary code. Further, from a legal per-
spective, a private code may serve as a defense or mitigator when a
corporation is sued for an employee's act which is forbidden under
the corporate code of conduct.100
A. Criticisms of Private Codes of Conduct
While private codes have the perceived legal effect of affording
a company protection, some commentators note that only a few
101. Id. at 15.
102. Id. The information received in response to a survey administered in conjunction
with this article reveals that the codes currently in place among the largest corporations
arose mainly in the 1970s as a result of what has been termed the "sensitive payments" era.
Corporations passed many internal codes of conduct partially in response to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 1498 (1977) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78-ff (1982)).
103. See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Echeverrian Wall. Two Perspectives on Foreign
Investment and Licensing in Mexico, 17 TEx. INr'L L.J. 135 (1982). Murphy's allegory of the
"Giant People" who roamed in the North refers to greedy U.S. investors who took resources
from the Mexican people, leaving them with little gold and few skills in return. Id. at 135.
With a history filled of such stories, a voluntary code may be an invaluable tool to heal old
wounds.
104. See Fatouros, supra note 89, at 182.
105. Although few courts have considered the legal effect of corporate codes directly,
courts have addressed the significance and impact of corporate codes. See Pitt & Gros-
kaufmanis, supra note 36, at 1605.
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courts consider corporate codes of conduct in their adjudication. 10
Further criticism suggests that private codes are not effective be-
cause their rules are easily circumvented and may be given no legal
significance. 107 Others argue that codes based on morality stifle in-
novation.0 s Last, codes are often criticized as being nothing more
than public relations ploys with little practical effect.109
Because private codes of conduct are made on a voluntary ba-
sis, host countries may perceive the codes as informal and non-
binding statements. However, host countries should not be misled
by the informality of a voluntary code. As one commentator notes,
"[e]ven these [voluntary guidelines] can have considerable impact,
attract sanctions at least of public opinion, and influence national
or international courts or other government officials."' 0
An additional problem for MNEs is the cost of implementing
a private code. A code of conduct may take months or years to
develop. In larger MNEs, this process involves extended negotia-
tion with different departments, centered around the chief execu-
tive officers' department.' The code may require amendment to
reflect the needs of the parties or to conform to changing social
pressures.112 Because of these costs, a code is likely to decrease
profits to the shareholders in the short-run which could adversely
affect the financial statements. This effect may especially concern
small MNE's.
These costs, however, should be weighed against the benefits
gained by adopting a code. A well drafted code may alleviate re-
gional political instability, increase trade to that region, promote
more competition to the marketplace, accelerate development in
106. Id. at 1606. A 1980 study found that over three-quarters of the officers surveyed
believed that the code afforded protection for the company. Id. at 1605. Pitt & Gros-
kaufmanis say that in reality, codes of conduct offer little protection against liability. Id. at
1605-14.
107. Id. at 1630.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1630-31. The authors note that empirical studies support the findings that
"there is little relationship between codes of conduct and corporate violations, contrary to
the expectation that the codes serve as an effective form of self-regulation." Id. (citations
omitted).
110. Professor John H. Jackson, Speech on Transnational Enterprises and Interna-
tional Codes of Conduct at the University of Michigan School of Law.
111. Interview with officer, Caterpillar Inc. (1992).
112. Periodically reviewing a code conforms the code to current needs, thus ensuring its
enforceability. Second, it allows the MNE to assess the code's overall effectiveness. Third, it
allows participants to determine with precision where revisions are needed. Fatouros, supra
note 89, at 190.
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poor regions of the world, and increase a region's standard of liv-
ing. Further, an increased per-capita GNP may convert a poor na-
tion into a nation of citizens who are consumers of MNE goods or
services.
A well drafted code can increase the good will of MNEs, mak-
ing host countries more willing to enter into business with them.
This increase in business will help MNEs expand in the more com-
petitive international marketplace and bring greater returns to
MNEs and their shareholders.
Another concern of host countries may be the effective en-
forcement of these codes. Critics maintain that compliance pro-
grams are undermined by financial pressures, organizational dy-
namics, and ordinary social contacts." 3 Others argue that codes of
conduct have limited efficacy because there are few, if any, en-
forcement provisions."" Even where enforcement provisions are
present, one may argue that even the best procedures cannot stop
intricate plans-there are limits to any compliance program.
1 15
Codes with enforcement provisions may only outline procedures or
rules for settling disputes and lack any concrete rules for specific
activities.
These criticisms, however, may be overcome, in large part, by
prudent drafting. Thus, a code containing concrete rules may be-
come enforceable. A well drafted private code should contain the
following:
(1) a structure for settling disputes;
(2) a mechanism for imposing sanctions;
(3) machinery for disseminating and collecting information;
(4) competent compliance monitoring; and
(5) institutional arrangements to modify the code or formulate
more detailed rules.
A well drafted code with similar provisions can be a powerful
tool that will be well received by both the host country and the
enterprise.
B. Success with Voluntary Codes: The Sullivan Principles
Evidence of the potential success of voluntary codes of con-
113. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 36, at 1631-32.
114. Id. at 1604-05.
115. Id. at 1632.
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duct can be evaluated by examining the corporate experience in
South Africa under the Sullivan Principles. Reverend Leon Sulli-
van, a black West Virginian Baptist minister, proposed the Sulli-
van Principles while serving as a member of the Board of Directors
of General Motors Corporation in 1977.11 e Sullivan established a
program designed to promote social justice and eliminate
apartheid."' He wrote a code of conduct for U.S. corporations do-
ing business in South Africa." s
Since their inception in 1977, the Sullivan Principles have af-
fected apartheid"'9 and the attitudes of U.S. corporations and in-
vestors. The Principles fought apartheid by helping black South
Africans gain workplace rights and by helping black industrial la-
bor unions win official recognition.120 Further, the Principles influ-
enced U.S. corporations in South Africa by making them aware of
injustices in the employment system' 2 1 by providing a focus for
company programs. 2 and by unifying the companies to act as a
group. The unificaiJon gave the corporations a sense of strength
through numbers as they confronted social issues in South
Africa.'
By 1984, there were 125 signatories to this voluntary code. 124
The numerous adoptions indicate that a voluntary code of conduct,
demanding responsibility beyond that which is legally required,
may be successful where certain social and economic factors that
116. See Reverend Leon Sullivan, Agents for Change: The Mobilization of Multina-
tional Companies in South Africa, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 427 (1983).
117. DAVID HAUCK ET AL., Two DECADES OF DEBATE: THE CONTROVERSY OvER U.S. COM-
PANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 97 (1983).
118. Id. at 97-98. The Sullivan Principles called for integrated workplaces, fair employ-
ment practices, and affirmative action. To become a signatory to the Principles, companies
must express written commitment to them, prepare and submit an annual report or self-
evaluation of progress, and pay a fee based on their aggregate worldwide sales. Anne. R.
Bowden, Note, North Carolina's South African Divestment Statute, 67 N.C. L. REV. 949,
949 n.3 (1989). A grading system also exists for measuring companies adherence to the prin-
ciples. See HAUCK, supra note 117, at 106.
119. See Tony Bloom, The Imperative of Enlightened Self-Interest in South Africa, in
BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF APARTHEID: U.S. FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 134-35 (Jonathan
Leape, et al., eds. 1985).
120. Going All-Out Against Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1986, § 3, at I.
121. Bloom, supra note 119, at 135.
122. DESAIX MYERS III ET AL., U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE ECONOMIC, POLITI-
CAL, AND MORAL ISSUES 97 (1980). Some company representatives characterized the Sullivan
principles as a catalyst that led companies to systemize programs for desegregation, train-
ing, and employee housing. Id.
123. HAUCK, supra note 117, at 103.
124. Bloom, supra note 119, at 221-23.
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motivate corporations to comply with the code of conduct are
present.12
Although the Principles have not been a complete success,
they do illustrate that private codes are and continue to be a vehi-
cle for change. More importantly, the Principles are a source of
guidance for corporations wishing to increase their social responsi-
bility by adopting voluntary codes of conduct.
IX. CASE STUDY: SURVEY OF THE LARGEST MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
While the Sullivan Principles represent a successful attempt
by MNEs to join together against a clearly defined problem, pri-
vate codes of conduct adopted by MNEs must be quite different.
These internal guides for employees serve as codes of general ap-
plicability that provide broad principles to be applied to all situa-
tions in every country. To be effective, any code with such a scope
must rely extensively on the integrity of the individuals in the cor-
poration, as Opposed to thle visibility of the problems. in oUner
words, the internal code of conduct is a repository of principles,
rather than an accuniulation of regulations. Tracing the steps from
the principles embodied in any internal code to application in any
given situation represents one of the greatest challenges in evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of the private code of conduct."ae
A. Origins and Purposes of the Corporate Codes
The origins of modern internal codes are found in three princi-
ple areas." 7 First, as the driving force behind their adoption, the
MNEs cited a general desire to formulate a single ethical policy.
Since disjointed corporate policies appear incapable of promoting
ethical behavior in employees, specific emphasis is needed to
change behavior. Second, the MNEs surveyed were concerned with
125. See Valerie A. Zondorak, A New Face in Corporate Environmental Responsibil-
ity: The Valdez Principles, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 457, 473 (1991).
126. The topic of the effectiveness of private codes of conduct is simply not ripe, be-
cause private codes of conduct in their current form have been in place for a short period of
time.
127. The codes received in response to the survey should be distinguished from the
Sullivan Principles. The codes attempt to take particular standards and problems encoun-
tered by the individual MNE and formulate general principles to guide all MNE employees.
Alternatively, the Sullivan Principles outline actions in response to Apartheid in South
Africa.
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adhering to standards of behavior created by both host and home
countries. An internal code can collect and distill the varying stan-
dards to which MNEs may be held." '2 Lastly, the survey showed
that MNEs with internal codes attempted to establish better rela-
tions with both the host and home countries.
Some critics seize upon this last element to support their argu-
ment that corporate codes merely serve as public relations ploys.
However, the survey results demonstrate that the effort to estab-
lish the codes usually extends to the highest echelons of the corpo-
ration with the auditing or the legal departments responsible for
implementation. 9 This indicates that MNEs are not merely mak-
ing a public relations ploy, but are in fact seeking to abide by their
codes.
B. Advantages and Pitfalls of Internal Codes
Undoubtedly, MNEs with internal codes are looking to even-
tually realize economic returns by adhering to their stated princi-
ples. A benefit of good corporate behavior may be higher profits
and preferential relations with the host country. An internal code
is a long-term investment purchased by an MNE at a cost, how-
ever. Such costs include the development, circulation, and imple-
mentation of the plan. In addition, the MNEs surveyed recognized
that corporations, by adhering to their codes, were at risk of put-
ting themselves at a competitive disadvantage in some parts of the
world.
Yet, some corporations noted that having a code and not en-
forcing it is worse than not enacting a code in the first instance.
The corporation that allows others, specifically host countries, to
rely upon its code in making decisions, may actually damage itself
more by not following through on the code's promises, than by not
enacting an internal code in the first instance. Two plausible rea-
sons for this conclusion exist. First, by ignoring their own private
code, the MNE risks not only being viewed as an unethical busi-
ness partner, but also as an untrustworthy one. An MNE without
any code may be viewed as just like all the others. But an MNE
128. An array of international and industrial groups have written codes of conduct to
regulate MNEs. The ICC and OECD are two from among this group. See supra part VII.
An internal code allows MNEs to adopt standards from these organizations' codes without
allying with occasionally conflicting groups.
129. See infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
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with an internal code that it does not adhere to may be viewed as
fraudulent and, thus, worse than all the others. This would destroy
the goodwill internal codes might otherwise generate.
The second explanation is the possibility that an internal code
may eventually become evidence of a reasonable legal standard to
which the MNE should be held. While there is currently little case
law supporting this proposition, Pitt and Groskaufmanis warn of
its possibility.13 0 The likelihood of this contingency may grow as
MNEs are brought into the courts of the United States as a result
of allegedly negligent behavior abroad."3 '
To offset the costs of an internal code, MNEs hope that, over
the long-term, other companies and nations will prefer to do busi-
ness with corporations that have adopted and followed internal
codes. Adherence to the codes develops trust in the relationship
between the MNE and its suppliers, host government, and custom-
ers. Suspicion historically surrounds the activities of MNEs
abroad. 13 2 Alleviation of this suspicion is the chief benefit of writ-
ing and adhering to an internal code. If this goal is achieved, the
MNE should gain more over the long-term than it lost in develop-
ing and following the code.
C. Substance of the Codes Surveyed
This author surveyed the fifty largest multinational corpora-
tions.1 3s Although the response to the survey was limited, the an-
swers and documents returned provide some insights into the ori-
gins, purposes, and contents of the private codes of the largest
MNEs. The extant codes are similar in form to the Sullivan Princi-
ples and the U.N. Draft Code of Conduct. However, the internal
codes reviewed were broader than the Sullivan Principles and more
lenient than the U.N. proposal. The codes surveyed are realistic
attempts by MNEs to guide employees in conducting corporate
130. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 36, at 1605-17.
131. The Supreme Court of Texas has recently caused an uproar by abolishing forum
non conveniens dismissal in cases involving wrongful death. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Cas-
tro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
132. See Patricia M. Robin, Comment, The BIT Won't Bite: The American Bilateral
Investment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 931, 956 n.172 (1984); see also Goler T.
Butcher, The Immediacy of International Law for Howard University Students, 31 How.
L.J. 435, 440 (1988) (noting the hostile attitudes toward foreign investment of a decade ago).
133. The MNEs surveyed were taken from a 1992 Forbes survey of the largest U.S.
multinationals. U.S. Corporations With the Biggest Foreign Revenues, FORBES, July 20,
1992, at 298. The author received nine responses.
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business with integrity. An analysis of the survey is presented
below.
The codes received in response to the survey varied widely as
to both form and content." 4 A review of the codes demonstrates
that the Caterpillar Code most specifically addresses the problems
encountered by multinationals when operating abroad.13 '
Modern internal codes may be broken into three parts. The
introduction defines the relationship between ethical conduct and
the long-term goals of the corporation. The body of the document
usually focuses on one or more areas of particular interest to the
promulgating MNE. Last, most internal codes contain some type
of enforcement and compliance provision.
D. Preliminary Statements and Introduction
The contemporary internal code begins with a definitive state-
ment of the corporation's goals. The long-term interests of the
shareholders are usually given priority from the outset. By begin-
ning in this manner, these documents dispense with any suspicion
that the code of conduct is a vehicle for transforming a capitalist
entity into a humanitarian institution. Rather, the message con-
veyed is that the corporate officers have determined that, over the
long-term, the interests of the shareholders will be enhanced-if
their managers act ethically. This underscores the generally prag-
matic nature of these documents. In sum, codes define the means
MNEs are willing to employ without significantly altering the ulti-
mate goals of the entity.
134. The codes reviewed may be divided into three basic categories. First, the codes of
general applicability promulgated by corporations such as IBM and Hewlett Packard were
geared toward employees at all levels in all countries. Second, a small group of corporations
have devised statements of "ethical business practices" that are coupled with corporation
position papers dealing with areas of particular interest to the MNE. This approach was
prominent in the industries with large stakes in intellectual property such as Merck and Co.
The third broad class of internal codes addresses the problems of employees conducting
business in host countries. General Electric, for example, uses a code of general applicability
which incorporates "international relationships and practices." Caterpillar Inc. formulated a
comprehensive code of conduct which is clearly directed toward employees in host countries.
135. For this reason, the author selected the Caterpillar Corporation's code of conduct
as illustrative of the fundamental issues addressed in this paper. CATERPILLAR INC., CATER-
PILLAR CODE OF WORLDWIDE BusiNEss CONDUCT AND OPERATING PRINCIPLES (1992) [hereinaf-
ter CATERPILLAR CONE]. While the Caterpillar Code is used extensively throughout this por-
tion of the paper, virtually all private codes of conduct address the same problems. The
emphasis on the Caterpillar Code arises not from its unique nature, but rather from its
emphasis and clarity.
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The Caterpillar Code illustrates this point. This Code com-
mences with a definitive statement of the goals of the corporation.
The enhancement of the long-term interests of the stockholders is
given priority from the outset."' 0 The document further states that
the corporation is attempting "to take a long range view of
things," '137 and the stockholders' interests, as well as long-term
profitability, are best served "through fair, honest, and intelligent
actions ...."138
E. Specific Areas of Interest
Virtually all internal codes of conduct address, in some form,
several areas which present problems for employees operating in
host countries. The codes generally address business relations in
the host country, the interaction of the MNE with the culture of
the host countries, and relations with the governments of the host
countries. Although no two codes are identical in their approaches
to these areas, the motivation in every case appears to be a desire
country.
In general, internal codes outline a methodology for company
managers to employ when dealing with differing business practices.
Inevitably, conflicts will arise between MNEs and their host coun-
tries' suppliers and customers. The problems encountered in any
country will inevitably vary, and in recognition of this, most inter-
nal codes introduce an element of flexibility into their management
systems to help alleviate the conflicts that do arise. The Caterpillar
Code takes this approach. This Code recognizes that "there are
differences in business practices and economic philosophies from
country to country.""" The Code continues by asserting that there
"isn't necessarily one best way, "140 and states a clear preference for
"more uniform business practices among countries and en-
courage[s] multilateral efforts to harmonize business practices and
136. Id. at 1.
137. Id.
138. Id. The Code states:
The company's most valuable asset is a reputation for integrity. If that becomes
tarnished, customers, investors, suppliers, employees, and those who sell our
products and services will seek affiliation with other, more attractive companies.
We intend to hold to a single standard of integrity everywhere.
Id.
139. Id. at 9.
140. Id.
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procedures......
While these statements are not a pledge to remain neutral,
they do appear to give Caterpillar managers operating in host
countries latitude to enter into negotiations with the understand-
ing that business practices may be changed. The reference to mul-
tilateral efforts142 recognizes the growing trend toward trading
blocks and groups, which is an attempt by host countries to gain a
competitive advantage over powerful MNEs, which often have rev-
enues dwarfing the GNPs of many host countries.
This fundamental imbalance of power leads to continuous
scrutiny of MNEs. Foreign corporations are sources of apprehen-
sion for many host countries. To allay these fears, internal codes
attempt to address the interaction between the MNE and the cul-
ture of the host country. The typical internal code of conduct ac-
knowledges the socio-economic problems which may develop or be
accentuated by the presence of large MNEs in a developing coun-
try.""3 These modern documents encourage cooperation between
the host country and MNEs. Through cooperation, as opposed to
antagonism, MNEs may address their impact beyond their own
corporate compound.
The Caterpillar Code has a tripartite approach to managing
the impact of the MNE on the socio-economic environment of the
host country. This Code recognizes that public responsibility is
vested in the company in three broad areas: "First, is the straight-
forward pursuit of daily business affairs .... The second category
has to do with conducting business affairs in a way that is socially
responsible .... The third category relates to initiatives beyond
our operations, such as helping solve community problems.'
The reason for these three elements is summarized in the
Code itself. The company desires that "Caterpillar's business activ-
ities make good social sense - and that Caterpillar's social activi-
ties make good business sense." '45 These provisions of the Cater-
pillar Code, taken together, show a concern for the environment in
which the corporation operates.
The Caterpillar approach is consistent with the position
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., id. at 9-11.
144. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
145. Id.
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adopted in the U.N. Draft Code of Conduct. That document states
that, "[wihile economic and technological development is normally
accompanied by social change, transnational corporations should
avoid practices, products or services which cause detrimental ef-
fects on cultural patterns and socio-cultural objectives as deter-
mined by Governments."" Thus, both the U.N. Draft Code of
Conduct and the Caterpillar Code recognize the potential impact
of an MNE on a host country and call for social responsibility on
the part of the corporation.
F. Governmental Relations Between Host Countries and
Surveyed MNEs
The nature of MNEs' involvement with host countries leads to
interaction between corporate personnel and government agents.
In general, private codes of conduct address the potential problems
that may arise from this contact.
The analuis of this interaotion is bifiicated Tha first leve!l ia
the systemic or legal level where MNEs are regulated entities sub-
ject to the laws of the host country. The second level is personal in
nature as it involves the interaction between corporate and govern-
ment employees.
The Caterpillar Code addresses both these areas in a direct
manner. At the quasi-legal level, this Code states that while the
laws of the host country must be obeyed, the company expects to
be a source of "constructive ideas for change in the law." 4" These
ideas are presumably to facilitate the concept that laws, in the eyes
of the MNE, are "not an end but a means to an end - the end
presumably being order, justice, and, not infrequently, strengthen-
ing of the governmental unit involved. '14  The Code also states
that "Caterpillar will offer recommendations to governments con-
cerning legislation and regulation," and will "selectively analyze
146. Draft Code of Conduct, supra note 70, T 13.
147. CATERPILLAR CODE, supra note 135, at 11.
148. Id. The corporate preference for stability as presented in a private code leads to
support for the government of the host country. While this almost certainly should be a
stance welcomed by the government of the host country, this position may lead to criticism
from opposition elements within the host country. In the case of Caterpillar Inc., the stated
desire to foster stability in the host country is clearly in the interests of the corporation. To
a great extent, the governments of host countries are the present and future customers for
this company. This status leads to a.desire for achieving stability to provide an atmosphere
in which development and equipment purchases may take place. See id. at 13.
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and take positions on issues which affect the company .. -
This position is markedly different from the proposed U.N.
Draft Code of Conduct which implies corporate subrogation to all
governmental policies, and states that "[w]ithout prejudice to the
participation of transnational corporations in activities that are
permissible under the laws ... of host countries . . . transnational
corporations shall not interfere in the internal affairs of host coun-
tries."1 0 Recognizing the potential disruption that may result from
the application of its Code provisions, Caterpillar does however in-
timate that it will "obey the law" while also offering constant ideas
for its change." '
The second level of relations, the interaction between corpo-
rate and government employees, is addressed by the Caterpillar
Code in much the same manner as the other private codes re-
viewed by this author.1 52 The provisions dealing with this area tar-
get payments or gifts from the MNE to government officials. The
Caterpillar Code requires that employees not "seek to influence
sales of [Caterpillar] products (or other events impacting on the
company) by payments of bribes, kickbacks, or other questionable
inducements. 1 58  However, although "employees are required to
make good faith efforts to avoid payment of gratuities or 'tips'"
such payments may be made in customary amounts when they
"are as a practical matter unavoidable. ' 15 4
149. Id. at 10 (emphasis in the original).
150. Draft Code of Conduct, supra note 70, 1 16.
151. CATERPILLAR CODE, supra note 135, at 11. This is both a blessing and a curse. The
topic of this paper is the content of the modern internal code, not the ethical or develop-
mental validity of these documents. A situation in which a MNE has entered a host country
and finds itself bolstering a corrupt government by its presence and adherence to the host
country's laws is easily foreseeable.
152. See id. at 11. In this area the United States based corporation is attempting to
comply with the terms of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977(FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-
213, 91 Stat. 1494, 1498 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78ff (1988)), and parallel standards of the host country or MNE itself. Pitt and Gros-
kaufmanis attribute the formation of some codes to passage of the FCPA. Pitt & Gros-
kaufmanis, supra note 36, at 1582. Whether the fear of sanctions under the FCPA or the
desire to avoid the scandals which led to the Act's passage played a role in bringing the need
for codes to the attention of MNEs is an open question. However, at the very least, pay-
ments from corporate officials to government employees is subject to multiple standards
addressed by the private codes. The Caterpillar Code closely mirrors the standard of the
FCPA.
153. CATERPILLAR CODE, supra note 135, at 11.
154. Id.
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G. Enforcement
None of the provisions adopted by any private code would be
effective without some type of enforcement mechanism. While
many private codes present coherent, manageable standards for
employees operating in host countries, the problem of enforcement
and sanctions still exist. Recognizing that return on investment
and the operation of the business on a daily basis may distract
employees from adhering to the terms of the codes, each document
contains some compliance provisions.
The private codes reviewed in conjunction with this paper
contain varying methodologies to make them functional in a real
life business setting. For example, the Caterpillar Code requires se-
lected senior company managers to prepare memoranda reporting
"events or activities which might cause an impartial observer to
conclude that the code hasn't been followed."' 5 These yearly re-
ports are conveyed to the office of the General Counsel for
review. 15e
Alternatively, some corporations, such as General Electric
(GE), have provided reporting addresses to employees who see pos-
sible violations.157 A third, approach, taken by Merck and Co., in-
cluded retaining an outside firm to operate an "alertline."'"5 These
155. Id. at 13.
156. Id. The responsibility of the corporate counsel to investigate and notify the corpo-
rate management or the board under general rules of professional conduct is an additional
layer of the enforcement of codes in a corporate setting. For a related article raising some of
the issues of ethical compliance, see Roger J. Goebel, Professional Responsibility Issues in
International Law Practice, 29 AM. J. Comp. L. 1 (1981).
157. GE's experience underscores the difficulty of enforcing an internal code of con-
duct. See Amal K. Naj, GE's Drive to Purge Fraud is Hampered by Worker's Mistrust,
WALL ST. J., July 22, 1992, at Al. GE recently plead guilty to charges relating to a high GE
official who diverted funds to an Israeli general. This incident occurred despite an elaborate
enforcement mechanism instigated by the company. Id. GE presents seminars and videos on
the internal compliance system and quizzes employees on available reporting methods. Id.
There are also toll free numbers, special reporting forms, and avenues for sending anony-
mous notes to the chief executive. Id. at A6. Despite all these efforts, employees state that
the strong attempt to encourage reporting is "hampered by a culture that puts extreme
emphasis on profit." Id. at Al.
This comment underscores the need to make the internal code of conduct an integral
part of the corporate culture. Ultimately, the success of any code will depend upon the
individuals within the corporation. The shift in attitudes necessary to achieve full imple-
mentation of the codes at every level of the corporation will doubtlessly be a long and pain-
ful process in many corporations.
158. The firm, Business Risks International, specializes in taking anonymous com-
plaints and forming reports to be forwarded to Merck's General Counsel.
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three forms of compliance constitute virtually all the alternatives
open to internal enforcement, with the exception of forming an in-
ternal ethical auditing service (this idea may be viewed as a subset
of Merck's compliance system).
To critics, these methods of enforcement may seem like sub-
stitutes for avoidance and corporate cover-ups. This argument is
not without merit. However, any method of enforcement will ulti-
mately turn on the willingness of individual employees to report
possible misconduct. Further, this author also notes the lack of
definite sanctions in many of these codes. Though the codes may
direct or proscribe conduct, they often fail to enumerate the penal-
ties for non-compliance. In this regard, one can argue by inference
that to violate a code provision is tantamount to improper behav-
ior punishable by discharge.
H. Corporate Motives Behind Private Codes
Are private codes and their enforcement provisions merely
public relations tactics? Alternatively, do the public relations as-
pects of private codes outweigh or hinder the beneficial effects of
private codes of conduct? Even a cursory response to this issue re-
quires a review of the essential principles and goals which any
code, public or private, should pursue.
From the perspective of the business community, the codes
help to create a necessary climate of mutual confidence for interna-
tional investment. However, at least one author realizes that the
potential benefits of an enforceable international code may easily
be exaggerated:
Achievement of a generally acceptable code would not do a great
deal to satisfy demands for a massive transfer of resources from
North to South, for such a transfer of resources is not within the
legal or economic power of privately owned corporations. A code,
however, would be at least one perceptible indicia of
cooperation.'
159. Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Con-
duct: A Study of the Relationship Between International Legal Cooperation and Economic
Development, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 903, 920 (1981).
For a thorough discussion of the role, content, and potential of voluntary codes of con-
duct, see Symposium: Codes of Conduct For Transnational Corporations, 30 AM. U. L. REv.
903 (1981). While these articles do not address the efforts by individual MNEs to adopt
internal codes of conduct, many of the issues presented concern international corporate
conduct.
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One may conclude that the "internal code, like the U.N. Draft
Code, is primarily a symbol of cooperation with and a pledge by
MNEs not to hinder the development of host countries through
their ongoing operations in the host country. The adoption of in-
ternal codes indicates a desire to cooperate. Since any offer to co-
operate is in some sense a public relations tactic, the corporate
codes necessarily involve public relations.
However, this categorization of private codes as public rela-
tions tactics underscores the role of private codes rather than ne-
gating their true value. When private codes are followed, they im-
prove the situation of all trading parties. The private codes achieve
at least some of their purposes if they allay fears and lead to coop-
eration between MNEs and host countries. MNEs adopt private
codes because they are justifiable in light of the alternatives which
confront MNEs in the emerging global business arena. At a mini-
mum, they are attempts to define the parameters of dealings be-
tween historically adverse parties.
An analysis of the recent literature indicates there is a growing
consensus that multinationals should be held accountable.1 60 Sev-
eral national and international entities have asserted the desire
and the right to regulate MNEs."' Host countries wish to regulate
the operations of MNEs to satisfy the demands of their own citi-
zens and commercial entities. 162
For example, during the 1970s, host countries began to reas-
sert control over natural resources and thereby control MNEs
within their borders. Indeed, MNEs have been plagued for some
time by expropriation and nationalization of their property located
160. See Laurel E. Miller, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of
Foreign Plaintiff Access to U.S. Courts in International Tort Actions, 58 U. CH. L. REv.
1369, 1378-79 (1991); Note, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Conveniens: Going Beyond
Reyno, 64 TEx. L. REv. 193, 194 n.10 (1985).
161. See supra note 93; see also Cecilia M. Waldeck, Note, Proposals for Limiting For-
eign Investment Risks Under the Exon-Florrio Amendment, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1193
(1991) (referring to Canada's national regulatory body which reviews and approves foreign
owned businesses); Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in
the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. Rav. 633, 667 (arguing that trade unions must
establish transnational organizations to confront MNEs on an international basis).
162. See generally David W. Beebrom, Symposium - Just Winners and Losers: The
Application Game Theory to Corporate Law and Practice: A Game Theoretic Approach to
the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 60 U. CN.
L. Rav. 305, 305 (1991) (stating host countries impose regulations on MNEs such as requir-
ing employment of local citizens); Janelle M. Diller, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1984 and the Multinational Enterprise, 73 GEo. LJ. 1465, 1466 (1985) (demonstrating that
U.S. regulation of MNEs traditionally protected U.S. commercial interests).
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in host countries."' 3 During the mid-1970s the threat of expropria-
tion and nationalization was greatest. "The number of expropria-
tions in 1975 was 4 times that of 1970 and 50 times that of
1961. ' '1'4 An executive of Mobil Oil Corporation expressed the
force with which some host countries have acted: "If they wish to
nationalize us, they do so. If they wish to eject us, they do so." ' 6
Moreover, the threat of expropriation and nationalization contin-
ues to concern MNEs today.166
In addition to the actions taken by host countries, many home
countries are recognizing a need to regulate the external activities
of MNEs based within their own borders. The FCPA is an example
of an attempt to exercise this power. 1 7 Further, the U.N. is also
developing a code that would regulate the activities of MNEs.'6 8
All of these bodies, host countries, home countries, and organiza-
tions have concurrent authority to regulate MNEs.5 9
MNEs confronted with this array of potential sources of regu-
lation could well find the cost of developing and enforcing an inter-
nal code of conduct defensible. Although MNEs may lose some
business to unethical companies in the short-run, the code may al-
lay the fears of governments, trading parties, and the international
community.
163. David G. Bradley, Managing Against Expropriation, HAav. Bus. REV., July-Aug.
1977, at 75-78; see also Acquaah, supra note 3, at 163; TURNER, supra note 6, at 13, 92.
164. Bradley, supra note 163, at 78.
165. Faneuil Adams Jr., Vice-President of the Mobil Oil Corporation, Comments to the
Conference on the Regulation of Transnational Corporations at Columbia Law School
(1976).
Although the oil industry is an example of a successful attempt by less developed coun-
tries to exert control over MNEs, other fields have not consistently reproduced similar
results.
166. In December 1991, largely for the purpose of attracting MNEs to conduct business
in their states, 48 countries signed the pan-European Energy Charter. See generally Energy:
Europe Signs Charter on Energy Supply, Inter-Press Service, Dec. 17, 1991 available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File. The Charter seeks to forbid nationalization of corporate
assets. Id.
167. FCPA, supra note 102. Note that the public outcry over the corporate scandals
that led to passage of the FCPA represents an event which most MNEs desire to avoid.
Public awareness of corporate indiscretions in the environmental field led to policy changes
by many multinationals. The adoption of private codes may be an attempt to avoid such
public criticism over corporate conduct in other areas.
168. See Draft Code of Conduct, supra note 70.
169. See generally William L. Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act
to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on Freuhauf v. Massardy, 83
HAv. L. REv. 579 (1970) (an example and discussion of the problems that arise when two
countries attempt to regulate the same transaction).
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X. CONCLUSION
MNEs should adopt private codes of conduct because such
codes are socially responsible. Codes of conduct written by MNEs
may bring more stability and predictability to relations between
MNEs and developing nations. Private codes may also increase the
return on shareholder investment, the MNEs' ultimate objective.
17 0
As the free market takes its course, MNEs with the most balanced
codes will gain the trust and confidence of host countries and will
accordingly receive competitive advantages. The effect of these ad-
vantages should drive other MNEs to adopt their own codes.
Moreover, regardless of the competitive reasons to adopt a
code, MNEs should consider their adoption because they are a
long needed vehicle of change. MNEs must recognize that their
time of complete dominance over developing nations is winding
down. They are held to increasingly strict standards of fair and
ethical conduct. Adhering to these standards will aid in ensuring
the long-term stability of the corporation and the host country. As
a result, the parties can create an atmosphere which will allow
MNEs to profit and expand, while cooperating with the host coun-
try as it struggles to enter the ranks of developed nations.
MNEs will continue to debate the value of adopting private
codes of conduct. However, private codes, when enforced, are po-
tentially powerful devices.17' Although there are obstacles to im-
plementing any private code of conduct, problems will occur re-
gardless of whether rules emanate from public international law or
from internal policy.
One should not dismiss these instruments merely because they
are somewhat flawed. Since private codes provide flexibility, may
be negotiated, and can be narrowly tailored to the needs of the
parties, they are a potentially more effective mechanism for achiev-
ing the root purpose of any code of conduct. That is, they can facil-
170. This is especially true if self-regulation through the codes is perceived as a viable
alternative to national or international regulatory schemes, the cost of which will probably
be borne by MNEs themselves.
171. Changes are never easy and historically involve great debates. "William Bradford
reported how the Pilgrims, having taken temporary refuge in Holland, debated their voyage
to America." BOORSTI, supro note 10, at 599 (emphasis omitted). "It was answered, [in
reference to the great debates], that all great, and honourable actions are accompanied with
great difficulties, and must be both enterprised and overcome with answerable courages. It
was granted the dangers were great, but not desperate; the difficulties were many, but not
invincible." Id. at 600 (quoting William Bradford).
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itate mutually beneficial exchange in a global marketplace. Simply
stated, private codes of conduct make good business sense and ful-
fill an obligation to behave as good neighbors in an increasingly
smaller world. In the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, "[in the
field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of
the good neighbor-the neighbor who respects ... his obligations
and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of
neighbors . . .
172. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN
POLICY, 1933-1941 3 (1942).
